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Abstract—Security is an important aspect for the future wire-
less networks. Since the number of network nodes increases con-
stantly, and, in addition, the networks are decentralized and ad-
hoc in nature, it becomes more challenging to apply the current
cryptographic methods that require exchange of keys between
the communicating parties. Information-theoretic secrecy is an
emerging security field that explores the possibility of achieving
perfect secrecy data transmission between the intended network
nodes, while possible malicious nodes (also called eavesdroppers)
are kept ignorant of the transmitted information. In other words,
that is the ability of the physical layer to provide security (beside
the reliability) of the transmitted (broadcasted) data. For that
reason, it is often called physical layer security. In this paper
we observe how a simple cooperative network with one relay
node can improve the physical layer security by decreasing the
area in which the eavesdropper can reside and listen to the
information transmitted to the destination. This region is called
vulnerability region and we provide its characterization. Under
certain conditions, the vulnerability region vanishes, which makes
our wireless system perfectly secure for any position of the
eavesdropper within the wireless network.
I. INTRODUCTION
Information-theoretic secrecy is a concept initially intro-
duced by Shannon [1]. Wyner defined the wiretap channel
and established the possibility to create almost perfect secure
communication links without relying on exchange of private
keys [2]. He showed that when the channel between the source
and the eavesdropper, called eavesdropper channel is weaker
than the channel between the source and the destination, called
main channel, the source and the destination can exchange
perfectly secure messages at a positive rate. At the same time
the eavesdropper is not able to receive any information. In
that case, we say that the secrecy capacity is positive. In other
words, a maximal level of secrecy is obtained. By ensuring
that the equivocation rate is arbitrarily close to the message
rate, one can achieve perfect secrecy in the sense that the
eavesdropper is now limited to learn almost nothing about the
source-destination messages from its observations. Follow-up
work by Leung-Yan-Cheong and Hellman [3] characterized
the secrecy capacity of the additive white Gaussian noise
(AWGN) wiretap channel. In their landmark paper, Csisza´r and
Ko¨rner [4] generalized Wyner’s approach by considering the
transmission of confidential messages over broadcast channels.
Recently, there have been considerable efforts on generalizing
these studies to the wireless channel and multi-user scenarios
(see [5]–[12] and references therein).
A model for the relay channel was introduced and studied in
the pioneering works by van der Meulen [13]–[15]. Substantial
advances in the theory were made by Cover and El Gamal [16],
who developed two fundamental coding strategies for the relay
channel. A combination of these strategies achieves capacities
for several classes of degraded memoryless relay channels.
Most of the work done so far was related to memoryless
relay channels with or without feedback. Usually, the research
related to relay channels is aimed at the increase of the trans-
mission data rate. Lai and El Gamal [17] studied the relay-
eavesdropper channel, and they proposed a new method called
noise-forwarding strategy. In [18], we study how cooperation
with multiple relays can improve the information theoretic
security. There, we introduce the vulnerability region and its
surface as a measure of how secret a given cooperative network
is. In addition, we study the bounds of the surface as a function
of the number of cooperating relays.
In this paper, we characterize the vulnerability region in
a single relay cooperative wireless network. Cooperation im-
proves the physical layer security in the network by minimiz-
ing the area in which the secrecy capacity is zero. We realize
that under certain conditions, this area, called vulnerability
region, vanishes. In other words, in this case, we have a
perfectly secure system and no matter where the eavesdroppers
reside, they will not be able to receive any information
intended to the desired destination. This will be possible by
carefully designed codes that achieve the secrecy capacity and
without any key exchange. The improvement in the security is
achieved by increasing the capacity of the direct channel by
the help of the relay, as well as decreasing the capacity of the
eavesdropper channel by introducing interference (jamming)
from the relay and the source. The cooperation by jamming
was previously studied in [17] and [19].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section II,
the system model is described, while in Section III, the
characterization of the vulnerability region is provided. The
conditions for which a perfect secrecy system can be obtained
are discussed in Section IV, and the paper is concluded in
Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Observe the four node relay-eavesdropper network in Fig. 1.
There is a source node that transmits data to a destination node,
while there is a malicious node (eavesdropper) that “listens”
to the transmitted information. In the following, we will use
the words eavesdropper and malicious node interchangeably.
There is a single relay in the network that cooperates with the
source by relaying the transmitted data and, hence, increasing
the information-theoretic secrecy. We consider the standard
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Fig. 1. Cooperative network with a source, a destination, a single cooperative
relay, and a malicious node (eavesdropper).
Gaussian channel in which the channel coefficients are deter-
mined by the distance between the corresponding nodes raised
to the negative power of the path loss coefficient β. The direct
channel is represented by the standard relay channel
Yd = d
−β/2
d,s Xs + d
−β/2
d,r Xr + Zd,
Yr = d
−β/2
r,s Xs + Zr. (1)
Here, Yd and Yr are the received signals at the destination
and the relay nodes, respectively, while, Xs and Xr are
the transmitted signals from the source and the relay nodes,
respectively. There is a power constraint on the transmitted
signals from the source node
E[|Xs|2] ≤ Ps,
and from the relay node
E[|Xr|2] ≤ Pr.
The fading coefficients are determined only by the distance
between the transmitting and the receiving nodes, such that
the ratio of the received power at node B and the transmitted
power from node A is given by d−βB,A and β is the path loss
coefficient. A more realistic model should include the random
fading, however, in that case the whole analysis is getting
more demanding. Here, we decided to consider only the simple
attenuation due to the path loss, in order to get some initial
ideas about the structure of the secrecy region. Both channels
in (1) have complex additive Gaussian noise, represented by
Zd and Zr, having zero mean and unit variances.
The malicious node observes signals from both, the source
and the relay and can receive part of their signals. Similarly
as in [18], we assume that the source and the relay are smart
enough to use part of their available power to introduce Gaus-
sian interference at the malicious node. Hence, the received
signal at the malicious node is represented by
Ym = d
−β/2
m,s
√
qXs + d
−β/2
m,r
√
kXr + Zm, (2)
where by the coefficients q and k we model how perfectly the
malicious node can listen to the source and the relay. We call
q a source synchronization coefficient and k a relay synchro-
nization coefficient. Note that q, k ∈ [0, 1], q = 1 (k = 1)
means that the malicious node is perfectly synchronized with
the source (relay) and q = 0 (k = 0) means that the malicious
node cannot receive anything from the source (relay). The
additive Gaussian noise at the malicious node Zm has zero
mean and variance
Var(Zm) = aPsd−βm,s + bPrd−βm,r + 1. (3)
That means, beside the thermal noise with unit variance the
source and the relay introduce some interference using part
of their powers. The interference introduced by the source
is generated by some portion of its power, that is aPs. Here,
a ∈ [0, 1] is called source interference coefficient and naturally,
a + q ≤ 1. Similarly, bPr is the portion of the relay power
that is used to “disturb” the malicious node, where b ∈ [0, 1]
is called relay interference coefficient and b+ k ≤ 1.
We assume that the positions of the source, the relay, and
the destination are fixed. In that case the secrecy capacity will
depend on the location of the malicious node. The secrecy
capacity of this cooperative system with a single relay is given
by
Cs = max(C − Cm, 0), (4)
where C is the capacity of the main channel between the
source and the destination, and Cm is the capacity of the
eavesdropper channel. Note that in this paper, the secrecy
capacity is used in a weak manner defined by (4). In this case,
the capacity of the main channel C will be the capacity of the
relay channel. The capacity of the relay channel is not known,
but here we do not need to use a particular expression for it,
since we will analyze the vulnerability regions as a function
of C. Since the secrecy capacity depends on the location of
the malicious node, we may consider it as a function in the
two dimensional plane, if without loss of generality we put
the source at the origin and the destination node at the point
(xd, yd), with dd,s =
√
x2d + y
2
d. Without loss of generality,
the location of the relay node is (xr, 0), xr ∈ R, meaning
dr,s = xr . Also, without loss of generality, we may assume
that the relay node and the destination node are always to
the right of the source node, or in other words, x r > 0 and
xd > 0. In that case, the secrecy capacity will be a function
of the location of the malicious node (xm, ym).
In order to proceed to the analysis, we use the following
definitions, introduced in [18].
Definition 1: The geometrical area (region) in which the
secrecy capacity is positive is called secrecy region.
Therefore, the secrecy region is
RS = {(xm, ym) : Cm(xm, ym) < C}. (5)
Definition 2: The geometrical area (region) in which the
secrecy capacity vanishes is called vulnerability region.
Hence, the vulnerability region is
RV = {(xm, ym) : Cm(xm, ym) ≥ C}. (6)
The goal is to minimize the vulnerability region which is
equivalent to maximizing the secrecy region. In the rest of
the paper, we characterize the vulnerability region. It is in our
interest to determine under which conditions it is minimal.
III. CHARACTERIZATION OF THE VULNERABILITY
REGION
In this section, we analyze the shape of the vulnerability
region, which is the region in which if any malicious node
resides, the communication between the source and the desti-
nation is not secret.
To start the analysis, note that by definition the secrecy
capacity if a malicious node resides in the vulnerability region.
In that case, within the vulnerability region, since Cs = 0, we
have
Cm(xm, ym) ≥ C. (7)
From our assumptions, the malicious node receives informa-
tion from both, the source and the relay, while at the same
time the interference is coming from both of them as well. In
that case, from (2) and (3) we have
Cm = log2
(
1 +
qd−βm,sPs + kd−βm,rPr
ad−βm,sPs + bd
−β
m,rPr + 1
)
. (8)
Hence, an alternative representation of the vulnerability region
would be
RV =
{
(xm, ym) :
qd−βm,sPs + kd
−β
m,rPr
ad−βm,sPs + bd
−β
m,rPr + 1
≥ 2C − 1
}
,
where
dm,s =
√
x2m + y
2
m,
dm,r =
√
(xm − xr)2 + y2m.
For convenience we can also express it as
RV =
{
(r, ϕ) : c1d
−β
m,s + c2d
−β
m,r ≥ 1
}
,
where
c1 =
(
q
2C − 1 − a
)
Ps,
c2 =
(
k
2C − 1 − b
)
Pr, (9)
and we switch to polar coordinates (r, ϕ) for the location of
the malicious node. Moreover, since xm = r cosϕ and ym =
r sinϕ we have
dm,s = r,
dm,r =
√
r2 + x2r − 2xrr cosϕ.
That means the vulnerability region is given by the polar
coordinates
c1r
−β + c2(r2 + x2r − 2xrr cosϕ)−β/2 ≥ 1. (10)
Depending on the sign of c1 and c2, we observe four
different cases.
Case 1: c1 ≤ 0 and c2 ≤ 0. In this case, since r−β and
(r2 + x2r − 2xrr cosϕ)−β/2 are positive, it is straightforward
that the vulnerability region vanishes. We shall see later that
this is the only case for which the vulnerability region vanishes
for any r and ϕ. Hence, this is the preferred case.
Case 2: c1 ≤ 0 and c2 > 0. From (10) we have
cosϕ ≥
r2 + x2r −
(
c2r
β
rβ−c1
)2/β
2xrr
. (11)
Hence, the vulnerability region is obtained as the union of
the following two regions
R2,1 =
{
(r, ϕ) :
∣∣∣∣∣r2 + x2r −
(
c2r
β
rβ − c1
) 2
β
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2xrr,
|ϕ| ≤ arccos
⎛
⎜⎝r2 + x2r −
(
c2r
β
rβ−c1
) 2
β
2xrr
⎞
⎟⎠
⎫⎪⎬
⎪⎭ ,
and
R2,2 =
{
(r, ϕ) : (r + xr)
β(rβ − c1) < c2rβ , ∀ϕ
}
.
That gives
RV = R2,1 ∪R2,2.
Case 3: c1 > 0 and c2 ≤ 0. Note that if c1 is positive,
rβ > c1 gives c1r−β < 1 and since c2 ≤ 0, (10) will be an
empty set. That means RV is non-empty only if rβ ≤ c1.
Then, from (10) we have, we have
cosϕ ≤
r2 + x2r −
(
|c2|rβ
c1−rβ
)2/β
2xrr
. (12)
Therefore, the vulnerability region is obtained as the union
of the following two regions
R3,1 =
{
(r, ϕ) :
∣∣∣∣∣r2 + x2r −
( |c2|rβ
c1 − rβ
) 2
β
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2xrr,
r ≤ c
1
β
1 , |ϕ| ≥ arccos
⎛
⎜⎝r2 + x2r −
(
|c2|rβ
c1−rβ
) 2
β
2xrr
⎞
⎟⎠
⎫⎪⎬
⎪⎭ ,
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Fig. 2. Shapes of the vulnerability region for c1 > 0 and c2 ≤ 0 (Case 3). Here c1 = 0.05, 0.5, 1, 2, 3, 4 and c2 is fixed at −0.05.
and
R3,2 =
{
(r, ϕ) : r ≤ c
1
β
1 ,
|1− xrr |β(c1 − rβ)
|c2| < 1, ∀ϕ
}
.
That gives
RV = R3,1 ∪R3,2.
Note that Case 3 is equivalent to Case 2. We describe it here
just for completeness with respect to (10). It is obvious that if
we change the coordinate system and place the origin where
the relay is, we shall get exactly the same results as in Case
2.
Different shapes of the vulnerability region for c1 > 0 and
c2 ≤ 0 (Case 3) are shown in Fig. 2. Here, β = 3 and xr =
0.8. The source node is represented by a square at the origin,
the relay node by a star and the shaded region around the
source node is the vulnerability region. If the malicious node
stays in this region the secrecy capacity is zero, i.e., secret
communication at non-zero rate between the source and the
destination is not possible. The shapes for Case 2 are exactly
the same if the source and the relay change their places. We
notice different shapes for different values of c1 and c2.
Case 4: c1 > 0 and c2 > 0. Note that if c1r−β ≥ 1, (10) is
true for all ϕ. In the case r > c1/β1 , from (10), we have
cosϕ ≥
r2 + x2r −
(
c2r
β
rβ−c1
)2/β
2xrr
. (13)
Then, the vulnerability region is obtained as a union of the
following three sets
R4,1 =
{
(r, ϕ) : r ≤ c
1
β
1 , ∀ϕ
}
,
R4,2 =
{
(r, ϕ) :
∣∣∣∣∣r2 + x2r −
(
c2r
β
rβ − c1
) 2
β
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2xrr,
r > c
1
β
1 , |ϕ| ≤ arccos
⎛
⎜⎝r2 + x2r −
(
c2r
β
rβ−c1
) 2
β
2xrr
⎞
⎟⎠
⎫⎪⎬
⎪⎭ ,
and
R4,3 =
{
(r, ϕ) : r > c
1
β
1 ,
(1 + xrr )
β(rβ − c1)
c2
< 1, ∀ϕ
}
.
That gives
RV = R4,1 ∪R4,2 ∪R4,3.
Different shapes of the vulnerability region for c1 > 0
and c2 > 0 (Case 4) are observed in Fig. 3 for β = 3
and xr = 0.8. The geometry of the vulnerability region is
completely described for all possible values of c1 and c2. In the
following section we discuss most interesting case where the
vulnerability region is zero, i.e., we have a perfect information-
theoretic secrecy system.
IV. PERFECT SECRECY SYSTEM
From the previous analysis, we observe that if the coef-
ficients c1 and c2 are negative, the system will be perfectly
secure for any position of the eavesdropper. The values of
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Fig. 3. Shapes of the vulnerability region for c1 > 0 and c2 > 0 (Case 4). Here c1 = 0.01, 0.03, 0.05, 0.5, 2, 4 and c2 is fixed at 0.05.
c1 and c2 depend on the transmit powers of the source
and the relay, the capacity of the direct channel and the
synchronization and interference coefficients of the source and
the relay. In order to determine in which case both c 1 and c2
are negative, we observe (9) and we find
C > max
{
log2
(
1 +
q
a
)
, log2
(
1 +
k
b
)}
. (14)
Since log(·) is a continuous and increasing function and all
coefficients are positive we may rewrite (14) that
C > log2
(
1 + max
{
q
a
,
k
b
})
. (15)
This tells us that if the coefficients q, a, k, and b are given,
a perfect information-theoretic secrecy is guaranteed if the
capacity of the relay channel is larger than the right hand
side of (15).
In the following text we consider the special cases a = 1−q
and b = 1− k. Then, we get
C > − log2(min{1− q, 1− k}). (16)
Note, however that in reality the synchronization coeffi-
cients will depend on the proximity of the malicious node
to the source and the relay node. An appropriate model for
that is needed. In [18], two models for the synchronization
coefficients are discussed. In Model 1 or the exponential
model,
q = e−dm,s ,
k = e−dm,r . (17)
In Model 2 or the Gaussian model,
q = e−d
2
m,s ,
k = e−d
2
m,r . (18)
If Model 1 is used, from (16), we get a perfectly secure
system if the malicious node is located such that
dm,s > − ln(1 − 2−C),
dm,r > − ln(1 − 2−C). (19)
If Model 2 is used, a perfectly secure system is obtained if
dm,s >
√
− ln(1− 2−C),
dm,r >
√
− ln(1− 2−C). (20)
Geometrically, this is a region outside of the union of the
two circles centered at the source and the relay locations. The
radii R of these circles are
R(1) = − ln(1 − 2−C),
for Model 1, and
R(2) =
√
− ln(1− 2−C),
for Model 2. The circles intersect if dr,s < 2R. In the worst
case, dr,s ≥ 2R, and we have an upper bound on the surface
of the vulnerability region as the surface of two circles. For
Model 1, the bound is
V
(1)
U (C) = 2π ln
2(1 − 2−C), (21)
and for Model 2, it is
V
(2)
U (C) = −2π ln(1− 2−C). (22)
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Fig. 4. The upper bound of the vulnerability region surface for Model 1 and
Model 2 as a function of C.
The corresponding upper bounds on the surface of the
vulnerability region are shown in Fig. 4. Note that for small
C, Model 2 behaves better, while Model 1 is better for
larger C. For large C, using the Taylor series expansion [20],
ln(1 − 2−C) ≈ −2−C , the bounds (21) and (22) can be
approximated as
V
(1)
U (C) ≈ π21−2C ,
V
(2)
U (C) ≈ π21−C . (23)
Note that Model 1 and Model 2, although not realistic mod-
els, help us to understand what happens to the vulnerability
region if the proximity is important for the malicious node to
synchronize with the transmitting source and relay nodes.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We characterized the vulnerability region for different pa-
rameters of the four node relay-eavesdropper channel. It is
shown that the physical layer security of this wireless network
can be increased by cooperation. Depending on the capabilities
of the malicious node, one could improve the security consid-
erably, by minimizing the vulnerability region. We observe
that under certain conditions a perfect information-theoretic
secrecy can be achieved by cooperation. In other words, a
network with no vulnerability region can be obtained. This
depends heavily on the assumed model for the synchronization
and interference coefficients. We present an example in which
for the earlier proposed Models 1 and 2 we numerically find
the upper bound on the surface of the vulnerability region.
Although the proposed analysis is for simplified models, we
believe it could serve as a solid starting point to study the
locations of the cooperating nodes in more complex networks,
such that the physical layer security of the entire system is
improved.
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